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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH, in the
interest of S.H., R.D., T.D., )
and P.D., children under
eighteen years of agef
STATE OF UTAH,
Petitioner/Appellee,
v.

Case #20030191-CA

]
]

E.B.

)
)

Respondents/Appellants

Priority 4

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
This
District

is an
Juvenile

appeal

from

Court.

a

final

order

The Utah Court

of

the

Third

of Appeals has

jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2a3 (2) (c) (1998), §78-3a-909 (1998), and Rule 3, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS, STATEMENT OF ISSUES
PRESENTED ON APPEAL, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Did the

ISSUE I:
concluding
terminated
service

that

trial

Appellantrs

court

abuse its

parental

based upon her performance

discretion

in

should

be

rights

under the

court-ordered

plan?

STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Application of statutory law to the

facts presents a mixed question of fact and law.
reviews

the

juvenile

court's

conclusions

of

This Court
law

for

correctness, affording the court some discretion in applying
the law to the facts.

State ex rel. G.B.. 2002 UT App. 270,

111, 53 P.3d 963, citing

In re C.B., 1999 UT App. 293, 15, 989

P.2d 76.

Did the trial

ISSUE II:
concluding

that

terminated

pursuant

and

court

Appellant's
to

abuse its

parental

UTAH CODE ANN.

discretion

in

should

be

rights

§78-3a-407 (1) (b) , (c) , (d)

(e)1?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Application of statutory law to the

facts presents a mixed question of fact and law.
reviews

the

juvenile

court's

conclusions

of

This Court
law

for

correctness, affording the court some discretion in applying
the law to the facts.

State ex rel. G.B., 2002 UT App. 270,

111, 53 P.3d 963, citing

In re C.B. , 1999 UT App. 293, 15, 989

P.2d 76.

1

UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a-407 was amended by Chapter 246 of
the 2002 General Session of the Utah Legislature, with those
amendments effective as of May 6, 2002. The Notes,
References, and Annotations to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a-407 state
that "[t]he 2002 amendment, effective May 6, 2002,
redesignated the introductory language and former
Subsections (1) to (9) as Subsections (1) (a) to (i)." This
case is unique in that portions of this case are guided by
the pre-amendment statute while other portions are guided by
the post-amendment statute; however, as Appellant argues
below, the post-amendment statute pertains to the ultimate
decision entered by the trial court in this matter. Thus,
to avoid confusion, Appellant will cite to the postamendment statute throughout.
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
United States Constitution, Amend. VI and XIV
Utah Constitution, Art. 1 § 7
Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-407 (2) (Supp. 2002)
Utah Code Ann. §78-3a-407(3) (Supp. 2002)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
S.H.,

R.D.,

T.D.,

and

P.D.

are

minor

children

(hereinafter the "Children") having been born on July 30,
1985, September 9, 1988, November 23, 1990, and April 14,
1994,

respectively.

Appellant,

L.D.

(hereinafter

"Appellant"), is the mother of the Children.
On May 25, 2001, the State of Utah
"State")

filed

its

Verified

Petition,

(hereinafter the

alleging

that the

Children were abused and/or neglected (R0026-R0029). On July
3, 2001, the Children were found by Judge Frederick M. Oddone
of the Third District Juvenile Court to be abused and/or
neglected (R0061-R0062).
On or about July 16, 2001, Appellant appeared before
Judge Christiansen of the Third Judicial District Court and
was sentenced and placed on probation, to include sixty (60)
days in jail.

On July

17, 2001, since no appropriate

alternate care was found for the Children and Appellant was
serving time in jail, the Children were placed with the
Division of Child and Family Services (hereinafter "DCFS")
3

(R0064-R0065). Appellant was released from jail on August 28,
2001, having satisfied her sentence of sixty (60) days (Tr. at
pp. 20-21).
On December 27, 2001, Appellant's probation was lifted
and she was required to serve the remaining 305 days of her
one (1) year sentence in the Salt Lake County Jail (R0075R0076; Tr. at pp. 36-37).

its Verified

Petition

On March 14, 2002, the State filed

for

Termination

of

(hereinafter the "Termination Petition").
Appellant

was

released

from

jail,

Parental

Rights

On August 3, 2002,

having

completed

her

sentence (Tr. at p. 36).
On August 23, 26, 27 and 29, 2002, the matter came before
Judge Oddone

for trial

Termination Petition.

(the "Termination Trial") on the

See, Addendum "A."

At the close of

trial, in exchange for an additional sixty

(60) days of

reunification services, Appellant entered an admission to the
facts alleged in the Termination Petition. See, Addendum "A"
and "B." On September 9, 2002, the trial court entered its
Findings

of

Fact,

Conclusions

the "Initial Decision"),

of

Law and Order

(hereinafter,

stating that it found statutory

grounds to terminate Appellant's parental rights, but that it
had reservations about whether it was in the Children's best
interests. A copy of the Initial Decision is attached hereto
as Addendum "C" and incorporated herein by this reference.
4

The trial court then ordered DCFS to provide a sixty (60) day
service plan to Appellant.
On November 6, 2002, the Guardian ad Litem (hereinafter
the "GAL") filed the Guardian
Judgment
Rights

on the
of

State's

Leanne

(R0291-R0293) .

ad Litem's

Petition

Belong

to

Motion

Terminate

to

the

Enter
Parental

(hereinafter the "GAL's Motion")

On December 23, 2002, the GAL's Motion came

for a hearing before Judge Oddone. See, Addendum "B." At the
conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found by clear and
convincing evidence that Appellant failed to comply with the
court-ordered service plan and concluded that it would be in
the best interests of the Children to enter Appellant's
admissions to the Termination Petition and terminate her
Id.

parental rights in and to the Children.
On
Findings
to Enter
Parental

February

11, 2003,

trial

of Fact and Order Granting
Judgment
Rights

of

on the
Leann

hereto as Addendum "B"),

State's
Delong

attached

hereto

"Termination Order").

as

court

entered

Guardian

ad Litem's

Petition

to Terminate

Parental
Addendum

of Fact,

Rights

Motion
the

Conclusions

(a copy of which

"A") (collectively,

Appellant filed her Notice

from the Termination Order on March 7, 2003.

5

its

(a copy of which is attached

and its Findings

of Law and Order Terminating
is

the

of

the

Appeal

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On

April

13,

2001,

Appellant was cited
occurred

law

enforcement

was

called

and

for child abuse for an incident that

regarding

the

minor

child,

T.D.

(R0026-R0029) .

Appellant was on probation at the time of the incident.
On May 25, 2001, the State filed its Verified
alleging

that

(R0026-R0029) .

the

Children

were

abused

and/or

Petition,
neglected

On July 3, 2001, the Children were found by

Judge Frederick M. Oddone of the Third District Juvenile Court
to be abused and/or neglected (R0061-R0062). At said hearing,
Judge Oddone placed temporary custody and guardianship of the
Children with DCFS, but stayed the placement on a day-to-day
basis

and

ordered

DCFS

to

provide

intensive

protective

supervision.
On or about July 16, 2001, Appellant appeared before
Judge Christiansen of the Third Judicial District Court and
was sentenced to one

(1) year for the April 2001 incident.

The sentence was stayed and Appellant was placed on probation.
Appellant's probation included service of sixty (60) days in
the Salt Lake County Jail, and restrictions on her contact
with the Children.

Since no appropriate alternate care was

found for the Children and Appellant was serving time in jail,
the State moved the trial court to lift the stay and, on July
17, 2001, the Children were placed with DCFS (R0064-R0065).
6

While in jail, Appellant attended the Mothers In Jail
Parenting Program, including courses in the following areas:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Communication Skills I (Styles)
Communication Skills II
(Specific skills with
children)
Discipline I (Styles, theory)
Discipline II (Specific skills with children)
Child Abuse Prevention/Coping Skills
Domestic Violence Prevention/Coping Skills
Daily Living Structures, Routines, Traditions]
Child Development
Child Health and Safety
Child Nutrition

11. Motion/Child Teaching and Bonding Activities.
See, Defendant's Exhibit #7. Appellant was released on August
28, 2001, having satisfied her sentence of sixty

(60) days

(Tr. at pp. 20-21).
On September

6,

2001, the matter

came

for a review

hearing before Judge Frederic Oddone, at which time Judge
Oddone authorized supervised phone contact and therapeutic
visitation between Appellant and the Children (R0067-R0068).
On September 13, 2001, the State filed its Order to Show Cause
against Appellant alleging that Appellant had attempted to
have

contact with

the Children

outside

the

scope of the

September 6, 2001, Order of the trial court (R0069-R0070) . On
September

27,

2001,

the

trial

court

found

Appellant

in

contempt and committed Appellant to the Salt Lake County Jail
for five (5) days.

Id.

The trial court additionally ordered

no contact between Appellant and the Children.
7

Id.

On or about September 27, 2001, Appellant completed a
twelve

(12)

week

Parent

Child

group

through

Cornerstone

Counseling Center in which she was enrolled with the minor
child, P.D. (R0255).
a

parenting

Defendant's

class
Exhibit

On October 10, 2001, Appellant completed
entitled
#5.

"Bridging

In November

of

the

Gap."

See,

2001, Appellant

completed another parenting class through the Division of
Youth Services.

See, Defendant's Exhibit #6. On November 21,

December 3, and December 10, 2001, Appellant attended family
therapy sessions with the minor child, R.D.
Exhibit #14.
Appellant

See, Defendant's

From November 6, 2001, through January 4, 2002,

attended

seven

out

of

eight

sessions

of

a

Communication Skills/Anger Management Group at Valley Mental
Health (R0254).
On December 27, 2001, Appellant's probation was lifted
because of the findings from the Order to Show Cause hearing
and she was required to serve the remaining 305 days of her
one (1) year sentence in the Salt Lake County Jail (R0075R0076; Tr. at pp. 36-37) . From February 27 through March 12,
2002, Appellant was released to a nonresidential program at
Orange Street Correctional Facility

(Tr. at p. 37).

After

realizing that Appellant was ordered to be in residential
treatment and had been incorrectly sent to a nonresidential
facility, the district court judge returned her to jail on
8

March 12, 2002.
sentence,

Id.

at pp. 37, 39.

While serving said

Appellant completed the following programs on the

dates indicated:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Cocaine Anonymous, April 27, 2002.
Uplifted Self Image class, May 3, 2002.
Money Mastery class, May 14, 2002.
Bible Study, LDS Institute of Religion, May 15,
2002.
Coffee Klatch, June 20, 2002.
Choices for Adults class, July 1, 2002, which
included classes on the following topics:
a.
Family of Origin
b.
Communication Skills
c.
Sexual Rights and Responsibilities
d.
Healthy vs. Unhealthy Relationships
e.
Gender Stereotypes
f • Anger Management
g.

Diversity Awareness

See, Defendant's Exhibits #1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12.
From March 20, 2002, through July 31, 2002, Appellant
attended nineteen
Recovery Program.

(19) sessions of the LDS Substance Abuse
See, Defendant's Exhibit #4.

From April

25, 2002, through July 30, 2002, Appellant attended twelve
(12) sessions of Women's Substance Abuse Counseling through
Cornerstone Counseling Center.

See, Defendant's Exhibit 13.

On August 3, 2002, Appellant was released

from jail,

having completed her sentence (Tr. at p. 36). On August 12,
2002, Appellant attended an intake assessment at Cornerstone
Counseling Center and was accepted into their Mother's and
Children's Intensive Outpatient Treatment Program (R0242).

9

On August 23, 26, 27 and 29, 2002, the matter came before
Judge Oddone for trial on the Termination Petition.
Addendum "A."
additional

See,

At the close of trial, in exchange for an

sixty

(60)

days

of

reunification

services,

Appellant entered an admission to the facts alleged in the
Termination Petition. See, Addendum "A" and "B."
9, 2002, the trial court entered
Conclusions

of

Decision"'),

stating

terminate

Law

and

Order

that

Appellant's

it

its Findings

(hereinafter,

found

parental

On September

statutory

rights, but

of

the

Fact,

"Initial

grounds
that

to

it had

reservations about whether it was in the Children's best
interests. See, Addendum "C." The trial court then took the
matter under advisement, ordered DCFS to provide a sixty (60)
day service plan to Appellant, and ordered Appellant to
strictly comply 100 percent with the court-ordered service
plan, which was adopted at a hearing held September 9, 2002.
See, Addendum "B." The order stated that if Appellant failed
to comply with any aspect of the service plan, the State or
the GAL could motion the trial court to accept Appellant's
admissions and enter judgment terminating her parental rights.
Id.

Upon conclusion of the sixty (60) days, the GAL's Motion
was filed.

See, Addendum "B."

On December 23, 2002, the

GAL's Motion came for a hearing before Judge Oddone.
10

Id.

At

the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found by clear
and convincing evidence that Appellant failed to comply with
the court-ordered service plan and concluded, solely based
upon that finding, that it would be in the best interests of
the

Children

to

enter

Appellant's

admissions

to

the

Termination Petition and terminate her parental rights in and
to the Children.
On

February

Id.
11, 2003,

the trial

court

entered

the

Termination Order, terminating Appellant's parental rights
pursuant to

UTAH CODE ANN.

§78-3a-407 (1) (b) , (c), (d) and (e) .

On March 7, 2003, Appellant filed her Notice

of Appeal

from

the Termination Order.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
UTAH CODE ANN.

§78-3a-407 was amended by Chapter 246 of the

2002 General Session of the Utah Legislature this year, with
those amendments effective

as of May

6, 2002.

At the

conclusion of the Termination Trial in August of 2002, the
trial court entered an order stating that, while it found
statutory grounds to terminate Appellants parental rights, it
could not find that it was in the best interests of the
Children to do so at that time.

The trial court chose to

order the sixty (60) day service plan at the conclusion of the
Termination Trial, thereby commencing a new action after the
effective date of the 2002 amendments. The 2002 amendments to
11

UTAH CODE A N N ,

§78-3a-407 apply to the sixty (60) day service

plan and, subsequently, the Termination Order.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "the exceptional
circumstances exception is ill-defined and applies primarily
to rare procedural anomalies."

State v. Holaate, 2000 UT 74,

112, 10 P.3d 346 citing

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 n.

3

Court

(Utah

1993).

This

has previously

dictated

that

"...the 'exceptional circumstances' rubric [may be employed]
where a change in law or the settled interpretation of law
color[s] the failure to have raised an issue at trial." State
v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 10 (Utah App. 1996).

This case is a

procedural anomaly where a change in law colored the ability
to raise the issues argued herein at trial in this matter.
This Court should address the matters under the exceptional
circumstances rubric.
UTAH

CODE

ANN.

§78-3a-407(2)

(Supp. 2002)

states

that

"[t]he court may not terminate the parental rights of a parent
because the parent has failed to complete the requirements of
a treatment plan."

On August

29, 2002,

the trial court

ordered DCFS to provide a sixty (60) day treatment plan for
Appellant.

On September 9, 2002, a hearing was held in which

the trial court adopted the treatment plan as part of the
court's order

(R0259-R0265; R0267-R0270).

On December 23,

2002, the trial court in this matter found that Appellant had
12

failed to comply 100 percent with a treatment plan and, based
upon

that

finding,

concluded

that

it

should

enter

Termination Order terminating her parental rights.

the

By the

plain language of §78-3a-407(2) , the trial court abused its
discretion
respect

to

in

relying

the

upon

treatment

Appellant's

plan

to

performance

terminate

with

Appellant's

parental rights.
UTAH

CODE

ANN.

§78-3a-407 (3)

(Supp.

2002)

states

follows:
(1) The court may terminate all parental rights with
respect to a parent if it finds any one of the
following:
(b) that the parent has neglected
or abused the child;
(d) that the child is being cared
for in an out-of-home placement
under the supervision of the
court or the division and and
parent
has
substantially
neglected, wilfully refused, or
has been unable or unwilling to
remedy the circumstances that
cause the child to be in an outof-home placement, and there is a
substantial likelihood that the
parent will not be capable of
exercising proper and effective
parental care in the near future;
(e)
failure
of
parental
adjustment, as defined in this
chapter;

13

as

(h)
the parent, after a period
of trial during which the child
was returned
to live in the
1
child s own home, substantially
and continuously or repeatedly
refused or failed to give the
child proper parental care and
protection; . . .
(2) The court may not terminate the
parental rights of a parent because the
parent
has
failed
to
complete
the
requirements of a treatment plan.
(3) (a) In any case in which the court has
directed
the
division
to
provide
reunification services to a parent, the
court must find that the division made
reasonable
efforts
to
provide
those
services before the court may terminate the
parent's rights under Subsection (1) (b) ,
(c), (d), (e), (f) or (h) .
As mentioned supra,
treatment

plan

the trial court ordered DCFS to provide a

to Appellant

on August

2 9, 2002,

and then

relied upon its finding that she failed to comply 100 percent
with

said

treatment

plan

to

conclude

that

terminating her parental rights should be entered.
the

orders

collectively

included

the

order

Neither of

in the Termination

Order

addresses the services provided by DCFS as required by §78-3a407(3) (a)
407(1)(b),

prior

to

terminating

her

rights

(c), (d) and (e) in this matter.

clearly abused its discretion.

14

under

§78~3a-

The trial court

ARGUMENT
I.

THE 2002 AMENDMENTS TO UTAH CODE ANN,
§78-3A-407 APPLY TO THIS CASE

This Court recently handed down a decision on June 12,
2003, in State in Interest of T.M., 2003 UT App. 191, at 120,
respecting the retroactivity of the 2002 amendments to UTAH
CODE

ANN.

§78-3a-407,

setting

the

filing

date

of

the

termination petition as the guiding date for whether the 2002
amendments apply, but also stating that "the substantive law
to be applied throughout an action is the law in effect at the
date the action was initiated." Ibid,

at 117, citing

State v.

Hiacrs, 656 P.2d 998, 1000 (Utah 1982) (emphasis added)2.

The

Termination Petition in the instant case was filed on March
14,

2002,

almost

two

(2) months

prior

to

the

statute's

effective date of May 6, 2002; however, the services at issue
in this appeal were not ordered by the trial court until
August 29, 2002, almost four

(4) months after the statute

became effective.
2

As of the filing of this brief, this Court's decision
in State in Interest of T.M. has not yet been released for
publication since the time for appealing has not yet run,
and it is still subject to revision by this Court before
publication in the Pacific Reporter. Even if the decision
regarding the retroactivity of the 2002 amendments at issue
here were overturned on writ to the Utah Supreme Court
during the pendency of this appeal, the reversal would still
be supportive of Appellant's contention that the 2002
amendments apply to this case.
15

This case is a unique one in that it has not followed
classical juvenile court procedure and is, in fact, a rare
procedural

anomaly.

Typically,

treatment

plans

and

reunification services are not ordered by the juvenile courts
after a termination petition is filed. Reunification services
are

ordinarily

following

determined

adjudication

of

at

the

dispositional

a neglect,

abuse

or

hearing

dependency

petition, and extend for twelve (12) months following removal
of the child(ren)3.

UTAH CODE ANN.

goal

to

is

changed

§78-3a-311.

termination

of

If the child's

parental

rights,

reunification services are usually terminated either by motion
of the parties or at a permanency hearing prior to, or in
conjunction with the filing of a termination petition. UTAH
CODE ANN.

§78-3a-312.

The trial court is authorized, however,

to extend reunification services for 90 days if it finds that
there has been substantial compliance with the treatment plan,
that reunification is probable within that 90 day period, and
that the extension is in the best interest of the child. UTAH
CODE ANN.

§78-3a-312 (3) (b) .

In State ex rel. B.M.S., 2003 UT App 51, 115, 65 P.3d
639, this Court reiterated the statutory requirements a trial

3

§78-3a-312(6)(a) indicates, however,
that a parent is not entitled to reunification services for
any specified period of time.
UTAH CODE ANN.
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court must adhere to in order to terminate a parent's parental
rights, as follows:
Utah law requires juvenile courts to make two
distinct findings before terminating the parentchild relationship. See In re C.K., 2000 UT App 11, \
18, 996 P.2d 1059. First, the court must find a
specific ground for termination, as required by
section 78-3a-407. See id.
Second, the court must
find that termination is in the child's best
interests. See id. The petitioner bears "the burden
of establishing both of these elements by clear and
convincing evidence." In re R.A.J. , 1999 UT App
329,1 7, 991 P.2d 1118.
The trial court articulated in the Initial Decision that it
found that there were adequate legal grounds to terminate
Appellant's parental rights; however, it also found that it
was in the best interests of the Children for reunification
services to be extended (See, Addendum "C;" R0263).
court

specifically

articulated

that

"...the

reservations about whether a termination of
parental rights at this time
interests."

Id.

The trial
Court

has

[Appellant's]

[is] in the children's best

In essence, the trial court could not find

the second prong by clear and convincing evidence required for
termination of Appellant's parental rights at that time.
such,

the

trial

court

entered

the

Initial

Decision

As
and

exercised its authority to extend reunification services in
accordance with UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a-312 (3) (b).

Id.

Based upon its reservations, the trial court stated in
the Initial Decision that it was taking the matter under
17

advisement for sixty

(60) days.

See, Addendum "C."

In

actuality, however, the trial court had rendered its decision
on the Termination Petition in the Initial Decision, signed
September 9, 2002.

Id.

Even with Appellant's admissions to

the Termination Petition, the trial court could not terminate
Appellant's parental rights at that time because it had
reservations about whether it was in the best interests of the
Children.

Id.

The trial court then commenced a new action by ordering
DCFS to provide a sixty (60) day service plan to Appellant.
Id.

When the GAL's Motion was filed, it was not to lift a

stay that was imposed by the trial court, but rather to hold
a new trial in the form of an evidentiary hearing to determine
Appellant's compliance or noncompliance with the court-ordered
service plan.

If Appellant did not comply, then her prior

admissions to the Termination Petition would be judicially
noticed and any new evidence would be considered by the trial
court

for a determination

Children.
evidence

of the best interests of the

When a close analysis is undertaken, since new
obtained

after

the

Termination

Trial

would be

presented and relied upon in the final Termination Order, it
is obvious that a new action was commenced with the ordering
18

of the sixty (60) day service plan.

Hence, the governing

statute in this case should be the 2002 amendments.
II. THESE MATTERS SHOULD
BE ADDRESSED UNDER THE
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES RUBRIC
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "the exceptional
circumstances exception is ill-defined and applies primarily
to rare procedural anomalies." State v. Holaate, 2000 UT 74,
112, 10 P.3d 346 citing
3

(Utah 1993) .

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 n.

This Court has previously dictated that

"...the 'exceptional circumstances1 rubric [may be employed]
where a change in law or the settled interpretation of law
color [s] the failure to have raised an issue at trial." State
v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 10 (Utah App. 1996).
Although

no

objection

was

made

during

the

trial

proceedings with respect to the issues argued below, it is
clear that this case is a "rare procedural anomaly" that
should be addressed by this Court. Holgate. As argued

supra,

this case is unique in that the trial court ordered DCFS to
provide reunification services after
already been held.

the Termination Trial had

The reliance upon those after-ordered

services for a decision terminating Appellants parental
rights raises the substantial question of whether the pre- or

19

post-amendment statutes apply.

Due to this rare procedural

anomaly, Appellant requests that this Court address the matter
under the exceptional circumstances rubric.

Holgate.

Additionally, a change in law occurred during the midst
of these proceedings which tainted Appellant counsel's ability
to preserve the matters at trial.

Irwin.

Petition was filed on March 14, 2002.

The Termination

The 2002 amendments at

issue here became effective as of May 6, 2002.

On August 29,

2002, the trial court ordered DCFS to provide an additional
sixty

(60) days of reunification services to Appellant. In

Appellant's

Docketing

Appellant challenged

Statement

a decision

March

28,

2003,

the trial court's conclusions of law

based upon the 2002 amendments.
rendered

filed

On June 12, 2003, this Court

setting the date of the

filing of a

termination petition as the guiding date for the applicability
of the 2002 amendments; however, that decision has not yet
been released for publication.

Hence, there has been a

change in law and the settled interpretation of the law in
this matter and this Court should address the matter under the
exceptional circumstances rubric.

20

Irwin.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN RELYING UPON APPELLANT'S
PERFORMANCE ON THE TREATMENT PLAN
TO TERMINATE HER PARENTAL RIGHTS
A.

The Trial Court Had No Discretion to Terminate
Appellant's
Parental
Rights
Based
Upon
Her
Performance Under the Sixty (60) Day Service Plan.

UTAH

CODE

ANN.

§78-3a-407 (2)

(Supp. 2002)

states

that

"[t]he court may not terminate the parental rights of a parent
because the parent has failed to complete the requirements of
a treatment plan." This subsection of UTAH CODE ANN. §78~3a-407
was presented

by Representative

Throckmorton

to the Utah

Legislature in House Bill 226 during the 2002 General Session.
After explaining the purposes of a service/treatment plan to
the House
articulated

of Representatives, Representative
the

legislative

intent

behind

Throckmorton

creating

subsection, as follows:
And what we've found is that sometimes those service
plans can be so in detail, so encumbering that
virtually nobody in the State of Utah would be able
to complete some of those plans. And a concern is
that you get towards the end of the proceeding and
the Division in times past-and I haven't heard of
this happening in the last few months-that there are
times in which they will say, you know, they haven't
completed the plan, and they don't base the
determination to terminate parental rights on the
fitness of the parent, whether or not they are doing
the proper job, it's simply that they have not
completed the plan. And so what this bill does is
two parts, initially, and then there is some
supporting language throughout the bill. The first
one is found on lines 258 and 259, and it's a very
strong statement, it says "the court may not
21

this

terminate the parental rights of a parent because
the parent has failed to complete the requirements
of a treatment plan." By placing that in section
407, . . . one thing that they will not be able to
use as a grounds to terminate a child is that they
have technically not completed the plan.
H.B.

226,

2002

Utah House of Representatives, February 5, 2002,

General

Session,

remarks

of

Representative

Matt

Throckmorton.
On August 29, 2002, the trial court accepted the parties'
agreement

and

treatment

plan

ordered

DCFS

to

for Appellant

provide

a

in exchange

admissions to the Termination Petition4.

sixty
for

(60) day

Appellant's

It was understood by

the parties and the trial court that, if Appellant failed to
comply with any aspect of the sixty (60) day service plan, the
State or GAL could motion
Appellant's

admissions

parental rights.

for the trial

and enter judgment

See, Addendum "B."

court to accept
terminating

her

In effect at the time,

however, was UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a-407 (2) (Supp. 2002), which

4

There is some confusion as to why Appellant was
required to enter her admissions in exchange for the
additional sixty (60) days of reunification services when
the trial court had the authority to extend those without
her admissions, especially in light of the fact that it had
basically heard all of the evidence regarding the
Termination Petition and still had reservations about
whether it was in the Children's best interests to terminate
Appellant's parental rights. It seems that extension of the
reunification services was warranted, regardless of whether
Appellant entered admissions to the Termination Petition or
not.
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denied the trial court any discretion to accept such an
agreement in that it "...may not terminate the parental rights
of Appellant..." based upon Appellant's performance under any
service plan.
The order granting the GAL's Motion, however, shows that
the trial court abused its discretion and did rely upon
Appellant's performance under the sixty (60) day service plan
when it stated as follows:
The Court hereby finds by clear and convincing
evidence that [Appellant] failed to comply with the
court-ordered service plan. Consequently, because
[Appellant] has had ample opportunity to remedy the
issues that caused the removal of her children into
State's custody and has been unwilling or unable to
comply with the services offered to her, the Court
concludes that it would be in the best interest of
the children to enter the admissions made by
[Appellant] in open court on August 29, 2002. The
motion of the Guardian ad Litem is hereby GRANTED,
and the Court orders the Guardian ad Litem to
prepare a separate Order of Termination of Parental
Rights.
See, Addendum "B." The only findings of fact entered in the
order

granting

the

GAL's

Motion

dealt

directly

with

Id.

The

Appellant's performance under the service plan.

trial court found that Appellant failed to comply with the
court-ordered service plan.

Id.

Based on that finding, the

trial court concluded that Appellant's admissions should be
entered.

Id.

Based on that conclusion, it ordered the GAL

to prepare the Termination Order. Id.
23

The order granting the

GAL's Motion relies solely on Appellant's performance under
the service plan to order the GAL to prepare the final order
terminating her parental rights5.

In essence, the trial court

relied solely upon Appellant's performance under the service
plan to find the second prong of best interests to terminate
her parental rights.

By the plain language of §78-3a-407 (2),

the trial court abused its discretion.
B.

The Trial Court's Abuse of Discretion
Appellant.

Prejudiced

As Representative Throckmorton stated, sole reliance upon
the service plan to determine termination of parental rights,
especially with 100 percent compliance set as the standard,
creates an encumbrance upon Appellant that virtually no one in
the State of Utah could stand up to.

H.B.

Representatives,

2002

remarks

of

stringent

February

Representative

requirements

5,

2002,

Matt

Utah House of

General

Throckmorton.

dealing with

5

226,

Session,

With

such

compliance, the trial

While it is true that the trial court had Appellant's
admissions to the Termination Petition on which to base the
termination, there were no other findings made at the
evidentiary hearing outside of Appellant's performance on
the service plan to base the trial court's conclusion that
her admissions should be reinstated. Additionally, the
trial court had the same admissions before it during the
Initial Decision and found that the second prong of best
interests of the Children could not be satisfied at that
time.
24

court runs the risk of terminating her parental rights based
on technicalities.
For instance, perhaps Appellant does not possess the
talent of organizing, all within sixty (60) days, a full time
job with benefits sufficient to support her and the Children,
housing, urinalysis tests, individual therapy, family therapy
individually with each child, a parenting class6, and a
domestic violence and anger management class7.

Say that,

hypothetically, because of this lack of organizational skills
Appellant does not comply with the service plan 100 percent by
maybe missing

one

important thing.
than

100

important

thing

to deal with another

This would technically be evidence of less

percent

compliance;

however,

this

lack

of

organizational skills should not dictate that a person's
parental rights should be terminated. Hence, just one of many
reasons the Utah Legislature amended

UTAH CODE ANN.

§78-3a-4 07

to include subsection (2).

As shown in the Statement of Facts above, Appellant
had already attended several classes; however, the sixty
(60) day service plan indicated that she needed to take yet
another one.
7

As shown in the Statement of Facts above, Appellant
has attended a domestic violence class previously; however,
the sixty (60) day service plan indicated that she needed to
take yet anther one.
25

As stated by Representative Throckmorton, sole reliance
upon the service plan also mistakenly shifts the focus of the
trial court to the technicalities rather than the question of
whether or not the parent is "doing the proper job."
H.B.
2002

226,

Utah House of Representatives, February 5, 2002,

General

Throckmorton.
has

Id.

Session,

remarks

of

Representative

Matt

It becomes not a question of whether Appellant

substantially

benefitted

from

the

services

to

appropriately adjust her life as a parent for the Children,
but rather it becomes a numbers game.

By relying solely on

the technicalities of a service plan, the real issue of
whether the errors have been corrected gets seemingly lost, as
happened here. The trial court should not have relied solely
on Appellant's performance under the service plan for a
determination as to termination of her parental rights.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ENTER A
FINDING OF REASONABLE SERVICES PRIOR
TO TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
UTAH

CODE

ANN.

§78-3a-407(3)

(Supp.

2002)

states

follows:

(1) The court may terminate all parental
rights with respect to a parent if it finds
any one of the following:
(a) that the parent has abandoned
the child;
(b) that the parent has neglected
or abused the child;
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as

(c) that the parent is unfit or
incompetent;
(f) that only token efforts have
been made by the parent:
(i)
to
support
or
communicate
with
the
child;
(ii) to prevent neglect
of the child;
(iii) to eliminate the
risk
of
serious
physical,
mental,
or
emotional abuse of the
child; or
(iv) to avoid being an
unfit parent;
(3) (a) In any case in which the court has
directed
the
division
to
provide
reunification services to a parent, the
court must find that the division made
reasonable
efforts
to
provide
those
services before the court may terminate the
parent's rights under Subsection (l)(b),
(c), (d), (e), (f) or (h) .
(Emphasis added).

It is well established that

the verb used in a statute, i.e., something
'must'

be

done,

is

the

single

most

f

ff

[t]he form of

may,f 'shall1 or

important

textual

consideration determining whether a statute is mandatory or
directory," State in Interest of M.C. , 940 P.2d 1229 (Utah
App. 1997) quoting
Construction
Dictionary,
the word

§

3 Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory
57.03,

at

7

(5th

ed.1992).

Black's

Law

Abridged Fifth Edition, at page 530, states that
"must," like

mandatory effect.

the word

UTAH CODE ANN.
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"shall," is primarily of

§78-3a-407 (3) (a) states that

the finding "must" be made and is, therefore, of mandatory
effect.
The trial court entered an order <3ri September 9, 2002,
requiring DCFS to provide services to Appellant in the form of
a sixty (60) day service plan. At a hearing held December 23,
2002, the trial court determined that Appellant

failed to

comply 100 percent with the sixty (60) day service plan and
ordered

the

Termination

GAL
Order

to

prepare

the

terminated

Termination

Appellant's

Order.

parental

The
rights

pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a-407 (1) (b), (c), (d), and (e).
According to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-3a-407 (3) (a) (Supp. 2002),
if the trial court has ordered

reunification

services be

provided by DCFS, the trial court does not have discretion to
terminate parental rights under Subsection (l)(b), (c), (d),
and

(e) , without

reasonable.

first

finding

that

those

services

were

The plain language of the statute shows that the

finding regarding whether the services offered by DCFS are
reasonable is mandatory, because the trial court "must" enter
the finding.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§78-3a~407 (3) (a) (Supp. 2002) .

The Termination Order is void of the requisite finding of
§78-3a-407(3)(a)

(Supp.

2002).

Based

on

this

void,

the

findings of fact contained in the Termination Order do not and
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cannot support the conclusions entered by the trial court
pursuant to §78-3a-407 (l)(b), (c) , (d), and (e).
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE,
respectfully

based

requests

upon

the

foregoing,

that this Court

Appellant

reverse the trial

court's Termination Order and remand the matter for a new
trial

in

accordance

with

the

requirements

of

the

2002

amendments.
DATED this 19th day of June, 2002.

Gary L. Bell
Counsel for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 19th day of June, 2002, I
mailed, first class postage prepaid, true and correct copies
of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to:
MARTHA PIERCE
Office of the Guardian ad Litem
450 South State Street
P.O. Box 140403
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0403
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140833
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0833
Justin Jensen
Attorney for the Natural Father
1192 East Draper Parkway #467
Draper, Utah 84020
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Addendum A
Findings
of Factf Conclusions
and Order Terminating
Parental
dated February 11, 2003

of Law
Rights,

Mottw McDonald (#8589)
Office of the Guardian ad Litem
450 South State, Suite W-22
P.O. Box 140403
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0403
Telephone: (801) 578-3962

*3g,

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT .JUVENILE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of:
HARTWELL, SARA (07/30/85)
S E L O N G . REBECCA (09/09/88)
DELONG, TAYLOR (U./23/90)
DELONG, PHILLIP (04/14/94)

FINDINGS OF FACT. CONCLUSIONS
S L A W AND ORDER TERMINATING
PARENTAL RIGHTS

Case Nos- 926186.926199. 016201. 926202
judue Frederick M-Oddone
Children under IS years of age
, ^
r e i v e d evidence in the trial of the State's
<v> •»* T7amP9 2002. the Courtt tecen-tacviuw
On August 2 , . 26.27 and _ K
On August ±j. -v.. ^,
Petition for the Termination of The Parental Rights of Leanne Delong and Daniel Delong.
Present were the natural mother. Leanne Delong. represented by Francis Angle}. the caseworker
for the Division of Child and Family Services. Heather Zahn, represented by Sheila Page.
Assistant Attorney General, and the Guardian ad Litem. Mollic McDonald. Daniel Delong's
attorney, Justin Jensen, was also present and Mr. Delong appeared by telephone to give
testimony.
At the close of the trial. Leanne Delong was advised of her due process rights and. at that
time, entered an admission to the facts alleged in the State's Petition for Termination of Parental
Rights. On the basis of Ms. Dclong's admission, the Court makes the followingfindingsof tacl-

d v e ^ O BO 92 -«M

FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court makes the following findings of fact by clear and convincing evidence:
1. Leann Delong is the natural mother of Sara HartwelK Rebecca Dclong. Taylor Defong
and Phillip Delong.
2. Daniel Delong is the natural father of Rebecca Delong. Taylor Delong and Phillip
Delong. During the nine years of Mr. and Mrs. Delong's marriage. Daniel Delong was the stepfather of Sara Hartwell.
3. Taylor Delong was adjudicated as an abused child and Taylor. Rebecca. Phillip and
Sara were adjudicated as neglected on July 3,2001.
4. These children have been in the custody and guardianship of the Division since July 16.
2001 due to the incarceration of the mother following her criminal conviction for physically
abusing Taylor. The mother served 60 days of a one year sentence and was released on probation
5. Leann Delong has foiled to comply with either the criminal courf s orders regarding
contact with children or this court's orders regarding visitation and contact with her children. She
has consistently attempted contact with the children outside the boundaries set for her visitation.
6. Taylor has required hospitalization due to his fragile emotional state. Ta\ lor\s
condition has been exacerbated by contact with his mother. Ms. Delong has repeatedlv ignored
orders not to attempt contact directly with Taylor. In December 200 K Ms. Delong ignored DCFS
and Taylor's therapists directives not to contact or attempt to contact Taylor, and engaged in
repeated telephone calls to Taylor's cottage at Primary Children's Residential Unit. Taylor's
response to these calls was to start cutting on himself and an attempt to hang himself The calls
on stopped when Ms. Delong was arrested.
7. In January 2002, Judge Christiansen revoked Leannc Delong's probation for her

dfr£iLO

£0 92

J

*W

• j^lui""* *)» "r. no contact order and imposed the 305 days I

i!

^ence.

8. The children are all doing better in titeir placements witliout contact with their mother.
9. f\\ (.oriiinii (•» her psychological evaluation, Leanne Delong has no ii^ivli' mu > in i
behavior and presents a physical and emotional risk to her children.
I' > tViuAmcl FVntty's whereabouts are unknown, and he has provkl
emotional or financial support for Sara I iartweJI.
State has attempted to provide the mother with numeiut,
since the adjudication of the shelter p*

. indication services

he children. The State has provided the mother

with: a DCFS caseworker, service plans, a psychological cxaniuuf ion, t-eterrals for treatment
therapeutic visitation, appointed legal counsel
13, The mother has tailed to comply with the terras of her sec vice plan, am I failed to
comply with the terms ^1 N,,T probation.
14. The children are all placed instable • *.;

: v^ine-s whet- their spec uil needs are

being met. I lie children all have appropriate contact with eacv \u : J.
improved. It is in the best interest ot

eiors have

uintain this arrangement, inasmuch as there

'were no suitable relative placements available to take the children as a sib*uu,. L
CONCl tfSrONSOFLAW
Based on the Court's findings that Leann Detong la\\t\ I u> comi»K with the Com t. u,u
service plan, the > >y n i IicirP" accepts Ms. Delong's admissions made in op^n court \ »i» ;\ i.;;ust

29.2002 and reaches thefollowingconclusions of law:
1. That the children have been neglected as defined in UCA § 78-^a- 103{ f )(q): an< 1
2. That pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 78 3a-407(2) (1 "994), Leann Delong has neglected
or abused her children, thereby justifying termination of their parental rights.

d4rc:An

i;i:

'*.

3. That pursuant to Utah Code Ann. <? /h u-»u/( T) (1994), Leann Deiong isanunfitor
incompetent parents,

*istifying termination of their parental rights.

4. That pursuant to UCA §78-3a-407(4) (1994), .<

^

> i o r and Phillip have

been cared for in an out-of-home placements under the supervision of the Division of Child and
Family Services. The agency has made diligent efforts to pre

** ?< services to f hv

'«

mother which she has substantially neglected, wilfully refiiscd, or has been unable or unwilling i«
remedy the circumstances that caused the children to -.

•< .V-tr, 'im'nu-.-i. ami thru

is a substantial Likelihood that the parents will not be capable of exercising proper and effective
parental care in the near fixture, thereby justifying a termination ol" their parental rights.
- y\v\\ pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407(5) (1994), Lcinn i Hon*: n«f» failed to
make a parental adjustment, thereb
6

termination of her parental rights.

! hat pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a~409< I »' j ii.. ,.hv^, ii. mental and

emotional conditions and neeo

nandates that they be adopted by parents who are

v ilii m: and able to meet their special conditions and needs
. ;

-

iterest of these children for the legal rights of'die !ia!iir;il I^C.III ,

to be terminated.
8 That it is propex that an "order be entered terminating the rights of Leanne Delong. to
Sara HartwelL RebeccaDelong. Taylor IMhnxii >md Phillip Delong.

Cjfr| ; > • ,

I" ii

'l.>

-*Kk

OR»ERTERMINATlN<; PARENTAL RIGHTS
• r * f i m of Fact and Conclusions of Law. the Court hereby
Based on the foregomg r indmgs ol Mot an
°RDERS:
,
u - ™ . | | Rebecca Delong. Taylor Delor,e
, Theparcntairi^ofLeannDe.on.toSaaHaxt.ell.RcKc
„ , ,11 , pcii liin! parentalrigiits
« i p D * * - h e * Snared. —
-V - - ' >
^
H ««tndv of the Utah Division ot Lhild and
.t;r,i,ffi in the care and custoay ui u«.
2. The children are continued IU me t«u
• * * P miroose of/^option or independent living.
Family Services for the purpose ow v
Dated this _H__dayof

dm : / n t:u y<i

JHW

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

V^

correct copy of the foregoing Findings
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Sheila Page
Office of the Attorney General
160 East 300 South. 6th Floor
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Robert Barron
Attorney for Leann Delong
254 West 400 South, Ste. 320
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Justin Jensen
Attorney for Daniel Delong
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Mollie McDonald (#8589)
Office of the Guardian ad Litem
450 South State, Suite W-22
P.O. Box 140403
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0403
Telephone: (801) 578-3962

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT .JUVENILE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of:
HARTWELL, SARA (07/30/85)
DELONG. REBECCA (09/09/88)
DELONG, TAYLOR (11/23/90)
DELONG. PHILLIP (04/14/94)

)

FINDINGS OF FACT. AND
ORDER GRANTING THE
GUARDIAN AD LITEM'S MOTION
TO ENTER JUDGMENT ON THE
STATE'S PETITION TO TERMINATE
THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF
LEANN DELONG
Case Nos. 9 lb I No • . i > I '>'' (>! 6201. 926202

Children under 18 years of age

Judge Frederick M. Oddone

On Decembe: _ •

>urt heard evidence on the Guardian ad Litem s M, «iion to

Judgment or '••M Siate's Petition to Terminate the Parental Rights of Leann Dclong.
Present were the n.- •

-.'.rr i )el<>ng. represented by Robert Barron, the caseworker

for the Division of Child and Famih b. : - :>.< s. Wendy Ottcly. rcpresemed by Sheila Cage.
AsMsi.ini \!torney General, and the Guardian ad Litem. Mollie McDonald.
PRE VK H is ORDERS OF THE COURT
On August 29.2002. Leann Delong entered admisMO"S to the State's Petition to
Terminate the Parental Right* •">' i eann Delong. At that time the Court rule

is.

Delong *s admissions, there were statutory grounds to terminate the parei'!a! • n u s oi i , ..-in
Delong and Daniel Deiom.

:e Court had lingering concerns about

rtt

it. - M l

t'.l'f .'6

~**w

'be in the best interest of the children to terminate Ms (,'etomi •< parental n<rhis in \w\\i of the tail
that Ms. Defong had only recently been releasedfromjail and had not had sufficient time to
begin individual therapy or look for housing and employment, i noivi i m *' n > «« < look Leann
Delong's admission under advisement for sixty days. During those sixty days, die Court' ordered
that Ms. Delong strictly comply with the court-ordered service plan which was adopted at a
hearing held on September v .:«?!'

>»' H I rder stated that if Ms. Delong failed to comply with

any aspect of the service plan, the Attorney General or the

cm could motion the

Court to accept Ms. Delong's -idmissi ons and enter judgment terminating her parental rights.
FINDINGS 1)1" i"A< r
After truiHki the evidence presented in support of the Guardian ad Litem • M n

«

Enter Judgment on the State's Petition to Terminate the Parental Rights of Leann Delong, the
<' i u'1 HI ictt- (In: following findings of facts:
• L Leann Delong tailed to tak<; uunioin urinalysis tests as ordered by the Court on
September 9,2002;
;

2. Leann Delongfoiledto participate in individual therapy on a consistent basis as

ordered by the Court on September 9,2002 and only complccecf two individual therapy sessions;
• Kt^ -I > vioni'- violated the No Contact Order Entered on September v \k) ' by :il'. w
and leaving messages for Emily

xapist treating Rebecca Delong;

4. Leann Delong failed to demonstrate that she mnttii,rned • n'^istcnt employment oi
stable housing separate from other adults as ordered by the Court on September 9.2002.

e2

JGW

ORDER
The Court finds by <. •

evidence that Leann Delong failed to comply

^ourt-ordered service plan. Consequently, because Ms- Delong ha
opportunity to remedy the issues that cause
UA\ IK-VM unwilling

j

-•

of her children ••-<) State custody ai id

or unable to comply with the services offered to hoi*. flu1 ( nun, COIICIIK les thai

it would be in the best interest of inr * hi J< ire.? TO outer the admissions made by Ms. Delong in
open court on August 29 200,2. The motion of the Guardiai i ad l noi .• I . M I H ill? \N FED, and
the Court orders the Guardian ad I item to prepare a septirate Order of Termination of Parental
Rights.
BY'

....._„_
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. 2003, a true and

correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 1 -aw and Order was mailedpostage prepaid in
Sheila Page
Office of the Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Robert Barron
Attorney for Leann Delong
254 West 400 South. Ste. 320
Sail Lake City, UT 84101
Justin Jensen
Attorney for Daniel Delong
1192 East Draper Parkway, #467
Draper. UT 84020
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a n d Order,
d a t e d S e p t e m b e r ' \ •'OiV1

Mollie McDonald (#8589)
Office of the Guardian ad Litem
450 South State, Suite W-22
P.O. Box 140403
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0403
Telephone: (801) 578-3962
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of:
HARTWELL, SARA (07/30/85)
DELONG, REBECCA (09/09/88)
DELONG, TAYLOR (11/23/90)
DELONG, PHILLIP (04/14/94)

)
;)
]
)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER

CaseNos. 926186, 926199, 916201, 926202
Children under 18 years of age

)

Judge Frederick M. Oddone

On August 23, 26, 27 and 29,2002, the Court received evidence in the trial of the State's
Petition for the Termination of The Parental Rights of Leanne Delong and Daniel Delong.
Present were the natural mother, Leanne Delong, represented by Francis Angley, the caseworker
for the Division of Child and Family Services, Heather Zahn, represented by Sheila Page,
Assistant Attorney General, and the Guardian ad Litem, Mollie McDonald. Daniel Delong's
attorney, Justin Jensen, was also present and Mr. Delong appeared by telephone to give
testimony.
At the close of the trial and after a review of the evidence with her counsel Ms. Leanne
Delong was advised of her due process rights and, at that time, entered her admission to the
Petition for Termination of Parental Rights. On the basis of Ms. Delong's admission, the Court
makes the following findings of fact:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Sara HartweiL Rebecca Delong, Taylor Delong and Phillip Delong are in the custody
of the Division of Child and Family Services, and are the natural children of Leanne Delong.
3. Taylor Delong was adjudicated as an abused child and Taylor, Rebecca, Phillip and
Sara were adjudicated as neglected on July 3, 2001.
4. These children have been in the custody and guardianship of the Division since July 16,
2001 due to the incarceration of the mother following her criminal conviction for physically
abusing Taylor. The mother served 60 days of a one year sentence and was released on probation.
5. Leanne Delong has failed to comply with either the criminal court's orders regarding
contact with children or this court's orders regarding visitation and contact with her children. She
has consistently attempted contact with the children outside the boundaries set for her visitation.
6. Taylor has required hospitalization due to his fragile emotional state. Taylor's
condition has been exacerbated by contact with his mother. Ms. Delong has repeatedly ignored
orders not to attempt contact directly with Taylor. In December 2001, Ms. Delong ignored DCFS
and Taylor's therapists directives not to contactor attempt to contact Taylor, and engaged in
repeated telephone calls to Taylor's cottage at Primary Children's Residential Unit. Taylor's
response to these calls was to start cutting on himself and an attempt to hang himself. The calls
on stopped when Ms. Delong was arrested.
7. In January 2002, Judge Christiansen revoked Leanne Delong's probation for her
violation of the no contact order and imposed the 305 days left on her jail sentence.
8. The Children are all doing better in their placements without contact with their mother.
9. According to her psychological evaluation, Leanne Delong has no insight into her

behavior and presents a physical and emotional risk to her children.
10. Michael Beatty's whereabouts are unknown, and he has provided no physical,
emotional or financial support for Sare Hartwell
11. Daniel Delong has a history of criminal conduct and engaged in sexually
inappropriate behavior with Sara and Rebecca. He has been in mental health counseling for many
years and is not emotionally able to care for any of his children.
12. The State has attempted to provide the mother with numerous reunification services
since the adjudication of the shelter petition on the children. The State has provided the mother
with: a DCFS caseworker, service plans, a psychological examination, referrals for treatment
therapeutic visitation, appointed legal counsel.
13. The mother has failed to comply with the terms of her service plan, and failed to
comply with the terms of her probation .
14. Sara is in Odyssey House and the other children are in placed in separate placements
where their special needs are being met. The children all have appropriate contact with each other
and their behaviors have improved. It is in the best interest of the children to maintain this
arrangement, inasmuch as there were no suitable relative placements available to take the children
as a sibling group.
15. At the request of all counsel the court met separately with each of the children and
counsel in chambers. Sara is almost 18 years old. Sara does not wish to return to live with her
mother but does hope to establish some sort of undefined contact with her at a later point in Sara's
life. Rebecca age 14, Taylor age 12, and Phillip age 8 are all in foster care. Each child expressed
a desire to have a continuing relationship of varying degrees with their mother if Ms. DeLong
could stabilize her life and benefit from counseling. None of them wished to return to live with

Ms. DeLong until she had the benefit of counseling and demonstrated progress.
16. Each child is flourshing and doing well in foster care with the state of Utah. However
the state is unable to place all of the children together in an adoptive home. Nor does the state
currently have adoptive homes for either of the boys individually.
17. Ms. DeLong was in jail for approximately 8 months of her service plan. While in jail
she attended a number of classes on parenting and substance abuse. However the court had no
way of measuring what changes and improvements if any in her skills as a parent as the petition
to terminate her parental rights was filed approximately three weeks after her release from jail.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
On the basis of the facts admitted to by Leanne Delong, the Court reaches the following
conclusions of law:
1. That the children have been neglected as defined in UCA § 78-3a-103(l)(q); and,
2. That pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407(2) (1994), Leanne DeLong and Daniel
DeLong have neglected or abused their children, thereby justifying termination of their parental
rights.
3. That pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407(3) (1994), Leanne DeLong and Daniel
DeLong are unfit or incompetent parents, thereby justifying termination of their parental rights.
4. That pursuant to UCA §78-3a-407(4) (1994), Sara, Rebecca, Taylor and Phillip have
been cared for in an out-of-home placements under the supervision of the Division of Child and
Family Services. The agency has made diligent efforts to provide appropriate services to the
mother which she has substantially neglected, wilfully refused, or has been unable or unwilling to
remedy the circumstances that caused the children to be in an out-of-home placements, and there
is a substantial likelihood that the parents will not be capable of exercising proper and effective

parental care in the near future, thereby justifying a termination of their parental rights.
5. That pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407(5) (1994), Leanne DeLong has failed to
make a parental adjustment, thereby justifying a termination of her parental rights.
6. That pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407(6) (1994), Daniel DeLong has made
only token efforts to support or communicate with her children, or to eliminate the risk of serious
physical, mental, or emotional abuse, or to avoid being an unfit parent, thereby justifying a
termination of the parental rights.
7. There are adequate legal grounds to terminate the rights of both parents however
the court feels it is in the best interest of these children for them to remain in foster care and if the
mother is unable to demonstrate significant and reasonable progress in therapy within the next
sixty days or if she violates the order as set forth above that upon motion of the guardian ad litem
or the attorney general that the court accept the mother's admission to the petition to terminate her
legal rights. The court notes that while there are sufficient grounds to terminate the rights of the
father it believes that it is in the best interests of the children to defer that decision until a
determination on the rights of the mother is finalized.

ORDER
Although the Court finds that there are statutory grounds to terminate the parental rights of
Leanne Deiong and Daniel Delong, based on the comments of the children, their ages, and the
lack of adoptive placements, the Court has reservations whether a termination of Ms. Delong's
parental rights at this time in the children's best interests. Therefore, on stipulation of all parties
the Court takes Leanne Delong's admission under advisement for sixty days. During those sixty
days, the Court enters the following orders:

1. Ms. Delong have no contact with the children, Sara Hartwell, Rebecca Delong, Taylor
Delong and Phillip Delong, and further that Ms. Delong make no attempts to contact either the
children or their foster families, schools, therapists or medical providers.
2. Ms. Delong is ordered not to use any controlled substance, or consume any alcoholic
beverages. Ms. Delong is ordered to submit to random drug testing and release the results of the
drug tests to DCFS.
3. Ms. Delong is ordered to maintain consistent employment and must provide proof of
her employment to DCFS.
4. Ms. Delong is ordered to find and maintain her own housing separate from other adults.
5. Ms. Delong is ordered to enter into individual counseling with a therapist agreed upon
by DCFS and the GAL. Ms. Delong must have at least one appointment per week with her
individual therapist.
6. Ms. Delong is ordered to have an evaluation by a psychiatrist to determine if psycho
tropic medication is appropriate. If Ms. Delong either violates any of the preceding orders, or
fails to make progress in her individual therapy, DCFS or the GAL may file a motion requesting
that the Court accept Ms. DeLong's admission to the Petition for Termination of Parental Rights.
It is expressly understood that any hearing on such a motion will only be concerned with her
inability or refusal to comply with the orders as set forth above and will not revisit her admission
to the petition to terminate or any of the facts already adjudicated.

Additionally, the Division of Child and Family Services is ordered to prepare a service
plan for Ms. Delong by September 9,2002, which will become part of the Court's order.

DATED this

( _ day of September, 2002.
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correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Order was faxed to:
Sheila Page
Office of the Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114.
Francis A. Angley
Attorney for Leanne Delong
254 West 400 South, Ste.320
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Fax:359-6873
Justin Jensen
Attorney for Dan Delong
1192 East Draper Parkway, #467
Draper, UT 84020
Fax: 545-8902
this

day of

, 2002.
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